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# Track Omicron's spread with molecular data

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On 26 November, the newly emerged variant Omicron was designated a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant of concern (VOC) (1). Rapid polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test results could improve estimates of the prevalence of Omicron around the world. The widely used Thermo Fisher TaqPath COVID-19 PCR assay was valuable in tracking the spread of the Alpha (B.1.1.7) VOC (2) because a deletion of amino acids 69 and 70 in Alpha's spike gene ( $\Delta 69-70$ ) yields a distinct absent S-gene ( $S^-$ ) despite positive test results. The Delta VOC lacks this deletion and is therefore S-gene positive ( $S^+$ ) on TaqPath PCR tests (3). The Omicron VOC shares the spike  $\Delta 69-70$  deletion with Alpha, which has dropped to negligible levels worldwide. Therefore, the frequency of  $S^-$  results can be used as a rapid proxy for the frequency of Omicron cases, provided initial detection of local circulation had been confirmed by sequencing.

To put this data to use, countries should prioritize the release of daily counts of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths disaggregated by  $S^+$ ,  $S^-$ , and unknown [e.g., (4)] as much as possible while taking logistical and privacy concerns into account. S-gene data could serve as a proxy for estimates of Omicron VOC prevalence (5) and help to understand the fraction of infections caused by Omicron (versus Delta) and the severity of Omicron cases, as measured by mortality and hospitalization. In low-resource settings where genomic sampling is absent, infrequent, or characterized by long turnaround times (6), S-gene data will help reveal the risk Omicron poses to pandemic control. Finally, through synthesis with serological data (7), S-gene data—shared in real time—could help to evaluate the degree of immune protection conferred by natural- and vaccine-elicited immunity in Omicron cases.

Although S-gene data will be informative, preferential sequencing of samples with an  $S^-$  result will lead to virus genomic datasets that are unrepresentative of the true underlying spatiotemporal prevalence of Omicron. To

provide adequate context for genome sequences, depositors to the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) database should use the newly introduced non-mandatory “sampling strategy” field to note how cases are selected and sampled for virus genome sequencing, including whether samples were specifically targeted for sequencing based on  $S^-$  PCR results. [We have used this field to plot the first 115 Omicron submissions to GISAID, stratified by sampling strategy (8).] Virus genomic datasets then can be compiled from cases known to have been sampled randomly from a given population and analyzed to generate more accurate estimates of Omicron's growth relative to other variants. Standard sampling strategies include random community sampling [the preferred sampling strategy for estimating lineage growth (6, 9)], targeted surveillance of defined subpopulations (e.g., vaccine breakthrough cases or international travelers), and enhanced sampling to investigate specific outbreaks or clusters.

Tracking SARS-CoV-2 lineages and variants, including Omicron, through GISAID (10), Pango lineages (11), and NextStrain (12) has provided valuable information about their spread in close to real time. However, genome sequencing intensities and turnaround times vary substantially across the world; in most countries, it takes more than 21 days after sample collection to deposit data in GISAID (6). Moreover, sampling strategies used to select samples for sequencing are heterogeneous across geographic regions (6) and often not reported in virus genome metadata. To evaluate risk and guide policy, there is an urgent need to incentivize the quick sharing of well-annotated genomic and S-gene-stratified surveillance data globally. By acting with speed, transparency, and consistency, we can establish norms to support better global responses to newly emerging variants.

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